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The Myth of Spartacus and the Tradition of the 
Oppressed
Ricardo Noronha
Abstract Most historiographical accounts of the Berlin upris-
ing of January 1919 depict it as a failed repetition of the Russian 
October, framing the Spartacists as twin brothers of the Bolsheviks 
and Rosa Luxemburg as the German counterpart to Lenin. Furio 
Jesi’s 1969 work, Spartacus. The Symbology of Revolt invites an alter-
native reading of the event, highlighting the difference between 
“revolution” and “revolt” as contrasting experiences of time. This 
article explores the connection between the Berlin uprising and 
the slave revolts of antiquity, using a concept coined by Walter 
Benjamin, “the tradition of the oppressed,” in order to understand 
the role of myth in modern revolutionary movements.
Introduction
This article analyzes the role of myths and symbols in modernity 
through the lens of two historical events separated by almost two 
thousand years: the slave revolts of ancient Rome and the Berlin 
uprising of January 1919. It argues that the summoning of the name 
of Spartacus by the Spartakusbund—a radical-left group operating in 
Germany during World War I—operated a distinctive break with the 
historical imagination of the modern workers movement, revealing 
a distinctive understanding of revolutionary politics. Inspired by the 
work of Nicole Loraux and Jacques Rancière, the article engages with 
the concept of “anachronism” in order to conceptualize a history of 
class struggle that is not tied to a linear conception of time. Making use 
of Furio Jesi’s distinction between “revolt” and “revolution” as con-
trasting experiences of time, it proposes an interpretation of the Berlin 
uprising as a messianic event.
The first section of the article argues that the political culture of 
the worker’s movement reflected a historical narrative inherited from 
the Enlightenment, one in which any connection between ancient 
slavery and modern wage-work was almost completely suppressed. 
It proceeds to analyze the writings of Furio Jesi and Walter Benjamin, 
using the notion of a “tradition of the oppressed” to elaborate an alter-
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nate genealogy of class struggle. The second section looks to the slave 
revolts of antiquity in order to understand how Spartacus became a 
metonymic symbol of rebellious slaves and a mythological archetype. 
The third section offers a reading of the Berlin uprising of January 
1919 as a “messianic” event, questioning the dominant trend of histor-
ical interpretation that presents it as a failed repetition of the October 
Revolution. The concluding section summarizes the main arguments 
of this interpretation of ancient and modern revolts, highlighting the 
connection between temporality and political agency, as well as the 
role of myths and symbols in the configuration of historical events.
1. Myth and temporality: the “tradition of the oppressed”
Mythical figures from antiquity were a common literary trope in early 
modern Europe, during which time Heracles stood as a symbol of state 
power and the Hydra of Lerma as a metaphor for political sedition.1 
It was also not unusual for Conservatives to use Roman aristocrats as 
role models, or for Radicals to draw inspiration from the politics of 
the Roman plebs.2 Marx was very much in accord with the spirit of 
his time when, inspired by Marat, he used the unproductive figure of 
the Roman proletarii to conceptualize the modern working class, even 
though a few years later, in a letter written to Engels, he described 
Spartacus as a “genuine representative of the ancient proletariat.”3 
This apparent paradox illustrates a semantic problem associated with 
modern appropriations of ancient terms. As Jacques Rancière observes, 
in the course of the nineteenth century the “proletariat” came to name 
both an “historical agent” and the conceptualization of a “rupture with 
the temporal logic of production and reproduction.”4 But it also high-
lights a defining aspect of the political culture of the classical worker’s 
movement, namely, the tendency of Socialist authors to seek inspira-
tion from the plebs” struggle for political recognition, rather than from 
the resistance of slaves to forced labor. This is all the more striking 
when one considers the constitutive role played by slavery, along with 
other forms of forced labor, in primitive capitalist accumulation.5 From 
the seventeenth century onward, all across the emergent Atlantic plan-
tation economy we find individuals subjected to nominally different 
conditions of exploitation joining together in struggle against their 
common oppressors.6 Additionally, legal debates during the nine-
teenth Century established a direct connection between the punitive 
role of the “prison-form” and the disciplinary apparatus surrounding 
the “wage-form.”7 If coercion was easily understood as a defining fea-
ture of political economy, why did the relation between slavery and 
wage-labor remain almost entirely absent from the political discourse 
of the worker’s movement? One possible explanation is that the choice 
of a plebeian genealogy allowed Socialists to depict wage workers as 
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citizens, thereby countering the negative image associated with the 
“dangerous classes.”8 Another, very similar one, would point to influ-
ence of Enlightenment ideals on the historical imagination of Socialists, 
who drew a great deal of inspiration from its narrative of “progress.”
A good example can be found in a 1919 lecture delivered by Lenin 
at Sverdlov University. Portraying the history of class struggle as a 
linear process compartmentalized in stages, Lenin highlighted the fact 
that Spartacus had been able to lead a “widespread uprising of slaves” 
against “the seemingly omnipotent Roman Empire.” However, Lenin 
argued, since it was “capitalism alone” which “enabled the oppressed 
proletarian class to become conscious of itself and to create the world 
working-class movement,” ancient slaves “could not clearly realize 
what their aims were” and therefore remained “pawns in the hands 
of the ruling classes.”9 For most Marxists, the slave revolts of antiq-
uity were predominantly defined by what they lacked—a “class party” 
and a “class consciousness”—and therein resided the explanation for 
their defeat. This reading of history was not without consequences. A 
few months later, while arguing for the militarization of labor, Trotsky 
characterized Soviet Russia as a “Proletarian Sparta”—an association 
with a distinctive Jacobin precedent—thereby converting the dictator-
ship of the proletariat into the inheritor of a slave-owning class.10
It is well known that “Jacobinism” was an enduring source of 
inspiration for Lenin.11 Even though his political thought suffered vari-
ations—particularly after reading Hegel’s Logic12—in June 1917 he still 
equated Jacobinism with the rule of the proletariat, which, “supported 
by the peasant poor and taking advantage of the existing material 
basis for advancing to socialism,” could not only “provide all the great, 
ineradicable, unforgettable things provided by the Jacobins in the eigh-
teenth century” but also “bring about a lasting world-wide victory for 
the working people.”13 This was not merely an acknowledgment of the 
specific character of the Russian social formation, with its “combined 
and uneven development.” It also expressed a philosophy of history 
in which “socialism” appeared as the offspring of the Enlightenment, 
with the proletariat taking up the progressive heritage of the bour-
geoisie to carry out its own emancipation. By imagining the Russian 
Revolution as a re-enactment and logical continuation of the French 
Revolution, the Bolsheviks adopted a rigid understanding of histor-
ical time, which determined what was possible or impossible, conve-
nient or inconvenient in any given moment.14 Since it was assumed 
that history followed a pre-determined course, according to a set of 
unchanging rules that could be “scientifically” identified, the political 
agency of the working class had to be subordinated to an organized 
vanguard capable of managing the conceptual tools of Marxism in 
order to accelerate the passage of one mode of production to the other. 
Jacobins were an example to be emulated, because they had performed 
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the tasks of the “bourgeois revolution” with the same firm commit-
ment that the Bolsheviks considered to be necessary in order to build 
socialism in Russia. It was far from accidental that, on her first polemics 
with Lenin, in 1904, Rosa Luxemburg argued passionately against this 
Jacobin inspiration, emphasizing the capacity of the working class to 
self-organize and conduct its own political struggle, without obeying a 
pre-determined historical script.15 By choosing Spartacus as an arche-
type during World War I, the circle gathered around her and Karl 
Liebknecht was, as we shall see, pursuing an entirely different horizon, 
both in terms of historical interpretation and of political strategy.
This brings us to the topic of “temporality,” the main subject of 
Spartakus, a “study of myths and symbols” written by Furio Jesi. By dis-
tinguishing revolt—a “sudden insurrectional explosion,” which could 
be “placed within a strategic horizon,” but didn’t necessarily imply 
“a long-distance strategy”—from revolution—a “strategic complex of 
insurrectionary movements, coordinated and oriented over the mid to 
long-term towards ultimate objectives”—Jesi characterized the Berlin 
uprising of January 1919 as a “suspension of historical time,” lying in 
the intersection between myth and history.16 By summoning the name 
of Spartacus, he argued, the insurgents had evoked the “epiphany of a 
mythical time,” activating its subversive memory in the course of their 
own revolt.17 Spartakus is a palimpsest with different levels of interpre-
tation, a text that offers a code to decipher the historical meaning of the 
Berlin uprising and, simultaneously, poses a challenge to its readers, 
demanding that we look further into the subjects of myth and tempo-
rality. Indeed, Jesi’s conception of myth cannot be understood without 
taking into account a tradition of research extending back to the nine-
teenth century, with which he kept an ongoing dialogue.
In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche underlined the fact that the 
ancient Greeks were “compelled to connect everything they experi-
enced, immediately and involuntarily, to their myths” in such a way 
that “even the most immediate present was bound to appear to them 
straight away sub specie aeterni and, in a certain sense, as timeless.”18 
Mircea Eliade developed this idea in his studies of myth, arguing that 
all “archaic” cultures were dominated by a cyclical temporality, in 
which only those events that mirrored eternity itself were considered 
worthy of remembrance.19 The living experience of such societies was 
structured around rituals and archetypes that recalled actions per-
formed in illo tempore by individuals of a divine or semi-divine nature, 
while the profane time of History was relegated to an inferior level.20 
The Hungarian philologist Karl Kerényi also grounded his “science of 
myth” in the notion of the “archetype.”21 An important source of inspi-
ration to Jesi, Kerényi established a fundamental distinction between 
“genuine” and “technicized myth”: whereas the first resulted from the 
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experience of immediate contact with the sacred, standing outside of 
history and beyond language itself, the latter belonged to the realm 
of the profane and could be seen as an equivalent to modern political 
propaganda.22
Radicalizing these assertions, Jesi coined the concept of “mytho-
logical machine” to describe the tension between “myth,” which he 
placed outside of history, in the “emptiness that exists between the 
divine and the human,” and “mythology” which he described as a con-
crete set of narrative devices located in a specific historical context, that 
simultaneously offered myths a concrete substance and captured them 
within its confines.23 Even though these hypothesis were still being 
forged when Jesi first wrote Spartakus, they can help us understand 
why, rather than denouncing the artificiality of “technicized myth,” 
Jesi carefully aligns the notion of “genuine myth” with that of “gen-
uine propaganda,” arguing that “in the moments of greatest political 
fervor, when political commitment has conditioned the authenticity of 
the experience of life,” propaganda can serve as “the very definition 
of truth.”24 Indeed, as he would add a few pages later, only the readi-
ness “to commit oneself totally (“rationally” and “irrationally”) to the 
struggle” could testify to the truth of one’s political convictions, which 
is why he considered that the choices made by the Berlin insurgents 
of 1919 demonstrated that “their propaganda was genuine, in other 
words, that it did not rely on deformed myths and that it had become, 
instead, an authentic language of truth.”25
If previous works on “Myth” help us to understand why Jesi 
opted to approach the Berlin uprising from the perspective of tem-
porality, the influence of Jewish messianism is no less important. As 
Gershom Scholem has noted, although the Jewish messianic tradition 
was marked by a permanent tension between restoration and utopia-
nism, the mythology developed by biblical prophets operated a pro-
found break with traditional cyclical temporality. 26 In it, the “apoc-
alypse” was understood as an irreversible suspension of historical 
time, one that would bring redemption to humankind. By inverting 
the traditional structure of myth, displacing divine intervention from 
the past into the future, messianic prophecy creates a peculiar sort 
of temporality, in which the present was conceived of as an anticipa-
tion rather than a repetition. Scholem’s study would later inspire his 
friend Walter Benjamin’s celebrated theses in On the Concept of History, 
wherein Benjamin attacks the “linear, homogenous and empty” con-
ception of time embodied in the notion of “progress,” establishing a 
connection between the notion of historical inevitability and the atti-
tude of political conformism typical of German social democracy. In 
short, Benjamin called for a “messianic arrest of happening” capable 
of disrupting the continuum of history:
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The subject of historical knowledge is the struggling, oppressed 
class itself. Marx presents it as the last enslaved class—the avenger 
that completes the task of liberation in the name of generations of 
the downtrodden. This conviction, which had a brief resurgence 
in the Spartacus League, has always been objectionable to Social 
Democrats. Within three decades they managed to erase the name 
of Blanqui almost entirely, though at the sound of that name the 
preceding century had quaked. The Social Democrats preferred 
to cast the working class in the role of a redeemer of future gen-
erations, in this way cutting the sinews of its greatest strength. 
This indoctrination made the working class forget both its hatred 
and its spirit of sacrifice, for both are nourished by the image of 
enslaved ancestors rather than by the ideal of liberated grandchil-
dren.27
The essay written by Jesi gains a deeper, more precise, tonality once we 
read it under this light. Not only did the invocation of Spartacus estab-
lish a different genealogy for the modern working class—depicting 
it as “the last enslaved class”—it also presupposed a specific notion 
of history, defined by Benjamin as the “tradition of the oppressed.” 
While “historicism” was based on the idea of a linear progression of 
time, with conventional historical narratives invariably reflecting the 
views of the victors of class struggle, Benjamin identified the act of 
“remembrance” with the possibility of fighting for “the oppressed 
past,” understanding each historical moment as a “constellation satu-
rated with tensions.” By summoning the image of the “enslaved ances-
tors,” the Spartakusbund was charging its own historical present with 
“splinters of messianic time,” through an act of anachronism that sub-
verted conventional temporality and enabled it to speak “an authentic 
language of truth.”
Jesi’s Spartakus—which was not, as he was careful to stress, a his-
torical account of the Berlin uprising—establishes a number of con-
nections between two sets of events with no apparent relation to one 
another, inviting us to travel back and forth between antiquity and 
modernity. As the rest of this article will argue, the actions undertaken 
in the streets of Berlin in 1919 were inseparable from a messianic con-
ception of time, through which Spartacus was resuscitated as an his-
torical archetype. But before we uncover the conditions permitting this 
“epiphany of mythical time” to occur, we must first look at the slave 
revolts of antiquity, to understand what converted them into such a 
powerful mythological material.
2. “Enslaved Ancestors”: The Specter of Spartacus
In his reflections on Politics, Aristotle defines slaves as “talking instru-
ments” and “living possessions,” according to the unwritten law by 
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which the spoils of war belong to the victor.28 This connection between 
war and slavery was an undisputed fact in the ancient Mediterranean, 
since armed conflict provided a constant flow of prisoners to be auc-
tioned in specialized markets and employed in all sorts of work. Far 
from being an isolated judgment, the definition put forth by Aristotle 
was common amongst the Greek and Roman upper classes, at a time 
in which slavery pervaded most domains of life. But, on certain occa-
sions, war could also open wide fissures along the social fabric, cre-
ating favorable conditions for slaves to rise up.
The unexpected role that slaves could play in these situations was 
not lost on the historians of the time. Writing about the stasis in Corcyra 
during the Peloponnesian War of the fifth century BCE, Thucydides 
notes that both the democratic and the oligarchic faction promised to 
free the slaves who helped them achieve victory.29 A few years later, 
the Messenian exiles of Naupactus—a group of slaves (“helots”) that 
had risen against the Spartans in 464 BCE—fought alongside the 
Athenians, helping them to build fortresses in Pylos and Cythera in 
order to allow other runaway helots to escape.30 The Spartans would 
repay in kind, establishing a fortress in Attica, Decelea, where runaway 
slaves from the Athenian mines could find refuge. Almost three centu-
ries later, in the first book of his Histories, Polybius narrated the “tru-
celess war” fought between Carthage and its mercenaries shortly after 
the First Punic War. A mutiny of unpaid soldiers aroused the rebellion 
of slaves in the African countryside, while an army of insurgents led 
by Spendius (a Campanian slave) and Matho (a Libian mercenary) laid 
siege to the city itself before it was eventually defeated.
The slave revolts of the late Roman Republic followed a different 
pattern. The uprising led by Spartacus in 73–71 BCE was the last of 
a cycle of rebellions originating in Sicily in 135–132 BCE, and which 
were resumed between 104–100 BCE. Ancient sources provide a lively 
account of these revolts, with Diodorus Siculus describing the events 
in Sicilia, while Plutarch, Appian and Sallust wrote about the rebel-
lion led by Spartacus.31 But not only are these accounts fragmentary, as 
the literary conventions and philosophical traditions of the age render 
the motivations and perspectives of the insurgents extremely hard to 
grasp. A recent historical work, written by Aldo Schiavone, moves 
beyond the narrow limits of ancient sources, shedding a peculiar light 
upon Spartacus.32 Before moving to that specific topic, however, a gen-
eral overview of this cycle of revolts is required.
A striking feature of the rebellions was the velocity with which 
they spread, catalyzed by an initial nucleus of insurgent slaves who cir-
culated around the countryside, drawing thousands of others into the 
fight. The fact that slaves were usually employed to deliver messages 
helped to propagate the movement, with the two Sicilian uprisings 
reverberating all the way into Attica, inciting the slaves who worked 
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in the Athenian mines to revolt.33 It is worth noting that, even though 
the Sicilian uprisings adopted very elaborate institutional frame-
works, and their leaders exhibited traditional symbols of authority 
from Hellenistic political culture (dressing in purple, wearing crowns 
or scepters, issuing coin, building palaces), slavery appears to have 
been abolished within the rebellious communities. Apart from a brief 
reference made by Diodorus Siculus to the inhabitants of the city of 
Enna, who were put in chains to manufacture arms for the insurgents, 
along with an occasion in which Spartacus forced three hundred 
Roman prisoners to fight to the death, in a mock gladiator show, we 
find little evidence that this institution was preserved in the context of 
the uprisings. On the contrary, there are numerous references to the 
efforts undertaken by the insurgents to liberate other slaves, if only for 
pragmatic reasons, related to the need to attract more fighters to their 
ranks.
The revolts gathered slaves from different geographic and cultural 
origins, with Gauls, Germans, Thracians, Greeks and Syrians (a des-
ignation which encompassed all those from the eastern shore of the 
Mediterranean) forming the most numerous contingents. There was 
a predominance of “chattel-slaves” from the Sicilian and Campanian 
countryside, where violent forms of submission and heavy labor loads 
were the rule. Herdsman also took on an important role, since they 
enjoyed freedom of movements and were permitted to carry weapons 
to defend their flocks, besides having a good knowledge of the country-
side and mountainous areas wherein rebellious slaves sought refuge. 
Gladiators formed a specific category of slaves, since they were trained 
fighters, usually with previous military background, being better fed 
and lodged, but also had to submit to a harsher discipline. It was not 
infrequent for relatively privileged categories of slaves, such as the vil-
licus (administrator) of the large estates, to participate in the revolts, 
which also attracted a considerable number of landless freeman. By 
contrast, the uprisings gained considerably less support among urban 
slaves.
As for the perceivable mindset of the insurgents, many authors 
point to a relation between the cult of Dionysius and the formation 
of a rebellious slave culture, which prompted the Roman Senate to 
forbid the practice of bacchanalia, those orgiastic celebrations wherein 
established social boundaries—separating the living from the dead, 
man from woman and freeman from slaves—were collectively trans-
gressed. The outbreak of the revolts was also associated with messi-
anic messages. Ancient sources tell us that the uprisings in Sicily were 
conducted by a certain Eunus, Salvius and Athenion, individuals of 
Syrian and Cilician background who had the gift of prophetic vision. 
Plutarch also claims that the wife of Spartacus (a Thracian like him) 
was a priestess of Dionysius who possessed prophetic powers and 
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interpreted omens. This allows us to imagine a loose intertwining of 
diffuse beliefs and cultural representations in which different symbolic 
and religious elements merged within a common narrative capable 
of binding individuals across a range of cultural backgrounds and 
inspiring them to struggle against slave-owners and Roman author-
ities.
The leadership ability and military knowledge of Spartacus clearly 
stands out in most accounts. However, the main difference between 
the bellum Spartacium and previous revolts resided not only in the role 
played by gladiators or in the charisma of its leader, but also in its 
geographical location in the Italian mainland. It was apparently easier 
to crush the rebellion at its start, by sending troops down the Appian 
road in the direction of Capua, the main center for gladiator training 
at the time, where the uprising commenced. But once the revolt spread 
and swelled to several thousands, it presented a much more serious 
threat to Roman power. From its very beginning, when less than a hun-
dred gladiators sought refuge in Mount Vesuvius, with the only exit 
blocked by a much larger Roman army, the tale of Spartacus appeared 
to be destined to become the stuff of myth. Not only that, the image of 
rebellious slaves erupting out of a volcano, climbing down its slopes 
using intertwined vines and falling upon Roman soldiers under the 
cover of the night conjured powerful images from Roman mythology.34 
Next thing you know, there was an army of slaves roaming around 
Italy, organized according to ranks and subject to a strict military disci-
pline, capable of repeatedly defeating Roman legions in pitched battle. 
By the summer of 72 BCE, if we follow the hypothesis put forth by 
Schiavone, Spartacus was ready to see himself as an “armed prophet,” 
called upon to repeat and surpass the deeds of Hannibal.35 We know 
little about how Spartacus framed his own actions, or what sort of col-
lective goal the insurgents pursued, but if we accept the possibility that 
they were not simply attempting to get back to their home countries 
and wanted to attack Rome itself—a plausible hypothesis, particularly 
after they found a way open towards Cisalpine Gaul, but decided to 
march south instead—we can imagine their actions to be motivated by 
a more ambitious calculation. Realizing that the Roman legions would 
pose a continuous threat, the slaves led by Spartacus may have estab-
lished a connection between collective emancipation, resistance to for-
eign occupation and the destruction of Rome. It is likewise plausible 
that all of this fitted into a prophetic layout, just as it had occurred in 
Sicily a few decades before, aligning the deeds of Spartacus with the 
thread of an older messianic message.
This brings us to the crucial matter of whether we can see the 
ancient slaves as forbears of the modern working class, part of a “tra-
dition of the oppressed.” Although this article is mainly concerned 
with the ways in which Spartacus would latter operate as a symbol, 
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it is worth considering the terms of historiographical debate on the 
subject. Schiavone argues at length against the framing of slave revolts 
under the category of “class struggle,” considering this to be a spe-
cifically modern “model of conflict and collective subjectivity” that 
cannot be transposed “backward in time to explain Rome or Greece.”36 
A similar argument was developed by Moses Finley, who dismissed 
the notion of “class struggle” in antiquity, sustaining that “conflicts 
between groups” gravitated around the “distribution of specific rights 
and privileges,” and that the slaves who revolted were only concerned 
“with themselves and their status,” not with “slavery as an institu-
tion.”37
Certainly, we need to be cautious when employing the concept of 
“class struggle,” not only because we know little about the actual moti-
vations of the slaves who participated in the revolts, but also because 
we risk reducing the complexity of Roman society to a teleological 
model of historical interpretation. In this regard, the warning laid out 
by Nicole Loraux, against the inclination to populate the ancient city 
with “industrialists,” “financiers,” “proletarians,” remains entirely 
valid.38 But all the same, we possess no other comparably consistent 
theoretical tool for understanding the dynamics of social stratification, 
power and conflict in and across different historical contexts. We can 
therefore follow the suggestion of Geoffrey de la Croix, and use “class” 
as a relationship of exploitation subject to historical variations, with 
the connection between ownership of land and control over forced 
labor emerging as a defining aspect of “class struggle” in the ancient 
Mediterranean.39
Once we move beyond a narrow understanding of “class struggle,” 
and cease looking for clear evidence of a “class consciousness,” the 
slave revolts of antiquity appear in a very different light. Rather than 
a static and timeless social structure, the late Roman Republic may be 
regarded at once as the culmination of old patterns of exploitation and 
simultaneously as a dramatic historical moment, in which class antag-
onism boiled up with the full weight of its disruptive force. Schiavone 
himself points in that direction, when he notes that, even though 
commodity production was limited to a small part of the economy of 
the ancient Mediterranean, the first century BCE bore witness to an 
unprecedented level of wealth accumulation, concentration of prop-
erty, and surplus production based on slave labor:
In the mindset of the dominant elites, slavery had become by far 
the most prevalent paradigm of wealth-generating manual labor. 
Production meant production by means of slaves. [...] The reifica-
tion of bodies—often branded with fire like ceramics or cattle—
was accompanied by an annihilating pressure that no economic 
rationality could fully explain. Frequently it was due simply to 
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a lack of measure and to a relentlessness on the part of the mas-
ters, springing from a mechanism of exploitation and dominion 
which, on that scale, was unprecedented and had no ethical or 
social points of reference. Nothing like it had ever existed until 
then. It was in this way that the Mediterranean became not only 
a sea of commodities and markets, but also a sea of slaves, com-
modities themselves just like any other—and, for a period of time, 
of slaves in revolt.40
Categories like “reification,” “exploitation” or “commodities” sug-
gest that the kinship between the slaves of antiquity and the modern 
working class is more than symbolic. And even though the ancients 
did not possess the notion of “abstract human labor,” the mecha-
nisms employed to convert the ancient Mediterranean into a sea of 
commodities were not entirely different from those which made cap-
italist accumulation possible. Once we enlarge our concept of “class 
struggle,” a hidden connection between antiquity and modernity 
emerges, comprising common patterns of resistance and rebellion, and 
directed against similar mechanisms of oppression and exploitation. 
In this sense, the slave uprising led by Spartacus was a direct attack 
against the political economy of the ancient Mediterranean, including 
the combination of panem et circenses that allowed the patrician elite to 
keep the urban plebs under control.
For more than two years, the greatest power in the Mediterranean 
suffered successive defeats against an army to whom even the statute 
of a legitimate opponent was refused. This posed an unprecedented 
challenge for an archaic culture dominated by notions of stability and 
continuity, caught between the novelty of empire and the conservatism 
of tradition. A considerable amount of time passed before the Roman 
senate would finally acknowledge the importance of this seditious 
threat against the established order. Crassus, a rich politician, was 
granted full power to deal with the rebellious slaves, while Pompeius 
and Lucullus were ordered to return from their military expeditions 
oversees to help him. Confronted by the entire Roman military machine, 
the army led by Spartacus was forced on to the defensive, renouncing 
its attack on Rome, before eventually suffering a crushing defeat in a 
pitched battle. Brutal punishment followed, with thousands of pris-
oners being crucified along the road connecting Capua to Rome, as a 
cautionary example to other slaves. Crassus was not, however, entitled 
to stage a triumph after his victory, since slaves in revolt were not con-
sidered to be legitimate military enemies. Presumably dead, the body 
of Spartacus was never found, contributing even further to his conver-
sion into a mythical archetype, a specter that would haunt the imagina-
tion of the Roman upper classes long after his death.41 The memory of 
Spartacus persisted because his actions disrupted the common experi-
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ence of time, opening a seemingly unprecedented horizon of possibili-
ties, only briefly glimpsed before they vanished almost completely. His 
name came to symbolize an unfulfilled prophecy of collective eman-
cipation, the “fragile messianic hope” which Benjamin placed at the 
heart of the “tradition of the oppressed.” It would take centuries before 
this remembrance was revived by other protagonists facing equally 
unfavorable odds. During World War I, as if time had folded upon 
itself, the specter of Spartacus erupted again onto the stage of history.
3. January 1919 and the suspension of historical time
If “Jacobinism” was an enduring source of inspiration for Lenin and 
other Marxists, “Bolshevism” would acquire a similar status after the 
October Revolution. Since Russia was a relatively backward social 
formation, the Bolsheviks counted on the support of the industrial 
proletariat of western Europe to pursue a “world revolution” against 
the capitalist system, identifying Germany as its epicenter. The immi-
nent prospect of a German Revolution consequently acquired an enor-
mous importance within their historical narrative, one that we may 
designate, resorting to Jesi, as the “mythology of Bolshevism.” This 
mythology was marked by varying levels of sophistication, ranging 
from Leon Trotsky’s History of the Russian Revolution to The History of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, commissioned by Josef Stalin, 
but some common tropes can nonetheless be singled out. Within this 
system of myths and symbols, a political organization—”the Party”—
was invested with the role of conscious interpreter of an unconscious 
process, embodying the determination to act according to a script dic-
tated by “history” itself. Since, according to a consecrated metaphor, 
violence was “the midwife of history,” insurrections were regarded as 
a sort of caesarean incision, to be conducted with scientific precision 
and technical efficiency. The seizure of power in Petrograd offered an 
ideal type for all revolutionaries, while the notion of “insurrection as 
an art” found its ultimate justification in the “trial of history” itself, a 
domain over which the Bolsheviks had ambitious claims. The writings 
of Victor Serge and Gyorgy Lukács, who were simultaneously sympa-
thizers of Rosa Luxemburg and late-comers into Bolshevism, framed 
the Berlin uprising according to these ideas. On the fourth anniversary 
of the Berlin uprising, while working clandestinely in Germany, Victor 
Serge wrote a late obituary to Liebknecht and Luxemburg:
Since 1919, January 15 has become a day of mourning for revo-
lutionaries all round the world. On January 15, 1919, the young 
German revolution was beheaded and the fate of the European 
revolution was compromised by the double murder of Karl 
Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. Nothing of that day must be 
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forgotten. The class war goes on. We must remember what the 
enemy did, what it is still capable of. […] Social Democracy under-
stood only too well that a class that has been beheaded is halfway 
to defeat […] Let us think of this on the day of Karl Liebknecht and 
Rosa Luxemburg. We must remember what the enemy is capable 
of. In the crime of January 15, 1919, there is a great historical les-
son.42
By depicting the working class as a decapitated body, Serge was, per-
haps unconsciously, drawing a political metaphor from antiquity, 
wherein the image of the body was employed to legitimize inequality 
and the division between the rulers and the ruled.43 His secularized 
martyrology was accompanied by a “great historical lesson,” painting 
the line dividing Communists and Social Democrats with blood. 
However great it might have been, the historical lesson wouldn’t last 
out the year, since the Komintern adopted a “united front” strategy in 
its Third Congress, and the German Communist Party (KPD) allied 
itself with the Social Democrat Party (SPD) in September 1923, joining 
the local governments of Saxony and Thuringia with the aim of arming 
the proletariat for an upcoming (and utterly failed) insurrection. As 
Serge put it, Communists did not “look at history fatalistically,” and 
“victory” or “defeat” remained the ultimate measure for any strategic 
or tactical choice.
Also in 1923, the Hungarian philosopher Gyorgy Lukács was 
developing a similar line of argument. In an earlier writing, dated from 
1921, Lukács had praised Rosa Luxemburg for grasping the “sponta-
neous nature of revolutionary mass actions earlier and more clearly 
than many others.” He added that even though she had “theoretically” 
predicted the defeat of the January rising “years before it took place,” 
and “tactically” foreseen it “at the moment of action,” she neverthe-
less “remained consistently on the side of the masses and shared their 
fate.”44 But only two years later, Lukács accused Rosa Luxemburg of 
overestimating the “spontaneous, elemental forces of the Revolution” 
and “exaggerating utopian expectations,” arguing that only a party 
that was “sufficiently adaptable, flexible and independent in judge-
ment of the actual forces at work”, capable of carrying out “sudden 
changes of front,” could successfully lead the proletariat to victory.45 
On the long run, the official texts approved by the Komintern would 
become little more than a dogmatic collection of quotes written to 
legitimize the periodic turns of Soviet foreign policy. But even from an 
early stage, when Bolshevism was still characterized by vibrant intel-
lectual activity, the Berlin uprising stood as an example of what was 
not to be done.46 It is also worth noting that the depiction of the Berlin 
uprising as a “day of mourning” caused by exaggerated “utopian 
expectations” tends to dominate historiographical accounts, thereby 
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illustrating the lasting influence of the mythology of Bolshevism.47 The 
following pages move in a different direction, using the notion of the 
“messianic event” as an alternative interpretative key to approach the 
uprising, thereby rescuing it from the martyrology of a “failed revolu-
tion.”
The Spartakusbriefe (“Spartacus’s letters”) begin being published 
in January 1916 by a small, underground network of dissidents from 
the SPD, who would eventually adopt the name Spartkusbund. Even 
though they firmly opposed the war—some of them participated in 
the Zimmerwald Conference alongside the Bolsheviks, in 1915—the 
Spartacists had little experience of clandestine action. They lacked 
a proper apparatus, and their most distinguished members, such as 
Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, Franz Mehring or Leo Jogische, 
spent a lot of time in prison for their public interventions against the 
war.48 In addition, they remained within the SPD until 1917, at which 
point they joined other (considerably more moderate) Social Democrat 
dissidents in the newly-created Independent Social Democratic Party 
(USPD). Therefore, even though their persistent agitation against the 
war offered them considerable prestige amongst sectors of the working 
class, the Spartacists had little in the way of organized intervention or 
political influence inside the factories. As for the choice of the name 
Spartakus, the writings of Rosa Luxemburg offer a plausible explana-
tion. In The Accumulation of Capital, published in 1913, she had antic-
ipated that the rhythm of capitalist accumulation was bound to slow 
down, prophesizing an era of crisis and war:
Imperialism is as much a historical method for prolonging capi-
tal’s existence as it is the surest way of setting an objective limit 
to its existence as fast as possible. This is not to say that the final 
point need actually be attained. The very tendency of capitalist 
development towards this end is expressed in forms which make 
the concluding phase of capitalism a period of catastrophes.49
This historical diagnosis motivated the sharp critique of militarism 
by the left-wing of German social democracy. As the armed con-
flict dragged on, causing an enormous death toll on the front and 
increasing deprivation in the rear, class struggle polarized German 
society, with workers being subjected to increasing surveillance and 
all sorts of repressive measures, including forced labor for those who 
went on strike or denounced the war.50 Simultaneously, thousands of 
Belgians, Polish and Russian war prisoners were submitted to forced 
labor, while others were simply deported to industrial areas inside 
of Germany. The experience of war operated a deep disruption in 
the “normal” order of things, thereby radicalizing class struggle. The 
image of the German ruling classes attempting to solve problems of 
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accumulation through foreign conquest, while submitting foreign 
war prisoners to constrained labor, suddenly made Roman antiquity 
appear as an obvious historical precedent, a past charged with “now-
time,” as Benjamin would put it. It was in this specific historical con-
text that Spartacus emerged as an archetype of rebellion.
Luxemburg’s writings acquired an increasingly messianic tone 
once the Kaiser was forced to abdicate, in November 1918. In an article 
written days after her release from jail, she conjured the image of the 
“Acheron in motion” to describe the “appearance on the scene of the 
social class struggle.”51 In mid-December, she claimed that “the final 
battle deciding the continuation or the abolition of exploitation” was 
imminent, and would be a “turning point in human history.”52 Such 
apocalyptic imagery was rendered explicit in the program she drafted 
for the German Communist Party (KDP), entitled What Does Spartacus 
Want?:
With the conclusion of world war, the class rule of the bourgeoisie 
has forfeited its right to existence. [...] Only the revolution of the 
world proletariat can bring order into this chaos, can bring work 
and bread for all, can end the reciprocal slaughter of the peoples, 
can restore peace, freedom, true culture to this martyred humani-
ty. [...] In this hour, socialism is the only salvation for humanity.53
Adding to this messianic tone, and perhaps not entirely unrelated to it, 
Luxemburg repeatedly employed the term “wage slavery.” This was 
strikingly at odds with the prevalent tradition of the worker’s move-
ment, well summarized by the Social Democrat Chancellor Ebert, who 
argued that “socialism” simply meant “hard work.” Moving away 
from this vulgar conception of political economy, the KPD program 
echoed concerns previously laid out by Marx in his Critique of the Gotha 
Program. More importantly, it expressed the viewpoint of workers con-
fronted with increasingly accelerated work rhythms and brutal pat-
terns of exploitation, particularly in the mining areas of the Ruhr, the 
port cities of the North and the large chemical industries. Rather than 
arguing that the “productive forces” should be managed in a more effi-
cient way by the representatives of the working class—a view shared 
by Bolsheviks and Social Democrats alike—Luxemburg’s program 
presented the abolition of the wage system as a precondition for the 
emancipation of workers:
The naked decrees of socialization by the highest revolutionary 
authorities are by themselves empty phrases. Only the working 
class, through its own activity, can make the word flesh. […] From 
dead machines assigned their place in production by capital, the 
proletarian masses must learn to transform themselves into the 
free and independent directors of this process.54
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In spite of significant points of agreement and existing personal ties 
between them, the political outlook of the Spartacists was substantially 
different from that of the Bolsheviks, who remained much more tied 
to the tradition of the Second International. There were also relevant 
differences in what concerns the practical circumstances in which they 
operated. Even though soldiers’ and workers’ councils were formed 
in both countries, Germany was not a “weak link in the imperialist 
chain,” as Lenin had defined the Russian Empire, and it had not expe-
rienced a military collapse on the same scale. This allowed the emer-
gence of a nationalist myth, according to which an undefeated army 
had been “stabbed in the back” by leftist politicians. Furthermore, since 
the abdication of the Kaiser had coincided with the armistice, most of 
the soldiers could be quickly demobilized and the power vacuum was 
considerably easier to fill. The German Revolution was not a “failed” 
attempt to follow the Russian example. It formed an entirely different 
chain of events, the outcome of which could not be anticipated by 
those who participated in it.
In this regard, it is worth looking at two important aspects of the 
Berlin uprising of January 1919. The first concerns the notion of a 
“Spartacist week,” that is, a putsch conducted under the leadership of 
the newly-founded KPD, completely isolated from the masses of Berlin 
workers. This was the dominant version of events propagated by Social 
Democrats, Liberals, Conservatives and Nationalists, the leitmotiv of 
a counter-revolutionary narrative that, not unlike the Bolshevik myth-
ological machine, portrayed the image of the Berlin uprising as a rep-
etition of Russian events with a different outcome. With the benefit 
of hindsight, we know that Liebknecht and Pieck were the only KPD 
members to participate in the “Revolutionary Committee” formed 
on the evening of 5 January, and that the “Revolutionary Delegates” 
(Revolutionären Obleute) associated with the USPD enjoyed an over-
whelming majority in it.55 But the mythology of a “Spartacus week” 
was not merely the result of an error of historical interpretation. It 
expressed the hatred nurtured by the SPD and the military high com-
mand toward Luxemburg and Liebknecht. As leading Spartacists, they 
had to be shot down, not because they were pulling the strings of the 
uprising, but because they symbolized the struggle against war and 
the denunciation of the SPD’s complicity in it. Additionally, their writ-
ings expressed, with remarkable clarity, a diffuse feeling that prevailed 
amongst the working class, expressed in the motto “All Power to the 
Worker’s Councils.” This aspiration to self-government, equality and 
internationalism, denounced throughout Europe as “Bolshevism,” 
was translated into German as “Spartacism.”
The second aspect that we must take into consideration concerns 
what Broué described as a “deep current of radicalization of the Berlin 
workers.”56 This radicalization had manifested itself in the strike waves 
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of the war period, culminating in the mass demonstrations that led to 
the abdication of the Kaiser. After a series of street clashes that followed 
the abdication, it reached a peak during the “Christmas crisis,” when 
Berlin workers took up arms in support of the revolutionary sailors 
from the People’s Naval Division, thereby forcing the government 
and the high command of the army abandon their intention of seizing 
control of the capital. By early January, thousands of Berlin workers 
had been instructed in the school of spontaneity and mass action, and 
the immediate experience of “revolt” was much more familiar to them 
than the overarching design of “revolution.” This allows us to under-
stand the pace at which events unfolded.
By sacking Eichborn, the USPD leader who acted as chief of police 
in Berlin, the government pursued a deliberate strategy of confron-
tation, with the aim of reinstating its authority. An act of protest was 
called by the organizations to the left of the SPD, quickly escalating 
into an uprising. After a massive demonstration of hundreds of thou-
sands of workers, on the morning of January 5, a few hundred armed 
men occupied some buildings (mainly printing presses), convinced 
that a decisive moment had arrived. As an armed clash became inevi-
table, time suddenly gained a unique quality:
During the first fifteen days of January 1919, the experience of 
time changed in Berlin. For four years the war had suspended the 
usual rhythm of life. Every hour had become an hour of waiting—
waiting for the next move (one’s own or the enemy’s). These were 
all instants in a greater wait, the wait for victory. In the first days of 
January 1919, that wait, which had matured over the previous four 
years, appeared to have been fulfilled by the sudden and tremen-
dously brief apparition of an atypical time in which everything 
that happened—with extreme speed—seemed to happen for ever. 
It was no longer a matter of living and acting in the framework of 
tactics and strategy, within which intermediate objectives could 
be immensely distant from the final objective and yet prefigure 
it—the greater the distance, the more anxious the wait. “Now or 
never!” One had to act once and for all, and the fruit of the action 
was the content of the action itself. Every decisive choice, every 
irrevocable action, meant being in agreement with time; every 
hesitation, to be out of time. When it all ended, some of the real 
protagonists had left the stage for ever.57
The notion of a change in the experience of time, with its obvious mes-
sianic resonance, conferred upon the uprising a singular character. This 
was not a date previously set on a calendar, a carefully planned chore-
ography of deliberate steps synchronized according to sound military 
principles. But to define the Berlin uprising by what it lacked is to miss 
the opportunity to understand how it was lived by those who partici-
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pated in it. Once the insurrection broke out, the Spartakusbund ceased to 
act as a party and simply became, as Jesi put it, a “flag for revolt,” a symbol of 
the determination to fight under unfavorable odds.58 After three days 
punctuated by solemn calls for unity of the parties of the Left, what 
had started as a rather bloodless mass movement gave way to increas-
ingly violent confrontation. In the process, Berlin was converted into 
a laboratory for counter-insurgency, according to a strategy conceived 
by the military high command and backed by the SPD. This consisted 
of the employment of heavily-armed units of volunteers, the Freikorps, 
composed of hardened war veterans and enthusiastic young national-
ists, alongside the few remaining reliable units of the army. Deployed 
through an extremely effective transportation and communications 
system, with enough speed to ensure an overwhelming tactical superi-
ority, these detachments were specifically conceived for civil war, and 
would later be deployed in the Ruhr, central Germany and Hamburg 
with exactly the same outcome.59 Rather than a failed attempt to 
re-enact the storming of the Winter Palace, the Berlin uprising marked 
the beginning of a new and unprecedented age of counter-insurgency, 
successfully applied in other European cities thereafter, in the course 
of a bloody “European civil war.”60
In the last days before being killed, already in hiding, Luxemburg 
acknowledged the fact that the fate of the uprising had been con-
demned in advance.61 But she also stressed the fact that a “revolution 
did not develop evenly of its own volition, in a clear field of battle, 
according to a cunning plan devised by clever strategists.” “The 
masses,” she added, were the “the rock on which the ultimate victory 
of the revolution” would be built, and following them into action had 
been the only politically acceptable choice. For his part, Liebknecht 
portrayed the coming revolution in an unmistakably messianic and 
apocalyptic tone:
Spartacus stands for the fire and the spirit, the soul and the heart, 
the will and the deed of the proletarian revolution. Spartacus 
stands for all the misery, longing, and determination of the 
class-conscious proletariat. Spartacus stands for socialism and 
world revolution. […] The clatter of the imminent economic col-
lapse will awake the sections of the proletariat that are still asleep. 
They will hear the trumpets of Judgment Day, and the corpses of 
the murdered fighters will rise from the dead to demand justice 
from the cursed traitors of the revolution. Today, the volcano is 
still rumbling underground—tomorrow it will erupt and bury 
them all in ashes and lava!62
The image of a volcano rumbling underground once again linked the 
German Revolution to the slave rebellions of antiquity. It is precisely 
that connection that reveals the historical meaning of both events. Just 
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like the bellum Spartacium, the Berlin uprising was located on a histor-
ical threshold, just as a new configuration of modernity was emerging, 
characterized by capitalist concentration, mass politics and industrial 
warfare. It was against this catastrophic course of history, anticipated 
by Rosa Luxemburg with exceptional foresight, that a brief suspension 
of time allowed the myth of Spartacus to reappear, as an image of the 
past flashing up in a moment of danger.
Conclusion
Because it elides the distinction between different epochs, “anachro-
nism” is seen as a capital sin by most historians. But anachronism can 
also correspond to the employment of fictional characters and imag-
inary events in historical narrative, reminding us of the fact that his-
torians need to use their imagination to conceptualize the past, and 
thereby calling into question the relation of the discipline with the 
“truth.”63 In this sense, myths can become powerful historical devices, 
capable of shaping the perception of time and inspiring political 
agency. By summoning Spartacus in the midst of World War I, dis-
placing him from his original historical setting and converting him 
into a symbol of rebellion, the Spartacists were performing a political 
operation, detaching themselves from the victors of class struggle. The 
choice of Spartacus as an archetype outlined a genealogy of domina-
tion and exploitation that reached back to ancient times and under-
pinned the very notion of “civilization” (it is worth noting that the 
rulers of the German and the Russian empires both named themselves 
after “Caesar”). Since, as Reinhart Koselleck observes, temporality lies 
at the heart of political struggle, framing its conditions of possibility, it 
cannot but interfere with the living present.64 In this regard, the Berlin 
uprising cannot be understood without taking into account the messi-
anic conception of time that inspired those who participated in it.
The Spartacists were much more inclined than the Bolsheviks to 
rely on the spontaneity of the working class and on its ability to self-or-
ganize in order to struggle against exploitation and oppression. Which 
is why, once historical events started to unfold in an untimely and 
unpredictable manner, the Spartakusbund simply became a “flag of 
revolt.” Identifying themselves with the demand of “All power to the 
Soviets,” Spartacists were perceived as an existential threat by both the 
SPD government officials and the high command of the German army. 
Their physical elimination, along with that of the radicalized workers 
of Berlin, was a precondition for the re-establishment of “normal time.” 
And, because the memory of the uprising could not but haunt the new-
ly-established Republic, it had to be recast as a “failed revolution,” the 
tragic result of a deliberate choice based on poor calculation. In this 
sense, it is revealing that both the enemies of the Spartacists and some 
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of the most prominent leaders of the Communist International con-
verged in the appreciation of their defeat. In the course of time, the his-
torical interpretation of the Berlin uprising would be subsumed within 
the mythology of Bolshevism, blurring the lines between “revolt” and 
“revolution.” Exploring anachronism in order to cast a different light 
upon the revolts of antiquity and modernity, moving across the bound-
aries of historical compartmentalization, allows us to address the event 
from an alternative angle.
Of course, subtracting the thoughts and actions of Rosa Luxemburg 
and Karl Liebknecht from a specific mythology does not imply 
restoring their “true” meaning, nor is this the task of historical inter-
pretation. This reinterpretation merely aims at rendering intelligible 
what inspired those thoughts and actions. In this regard, the choices 
that led Luxemburg, Liebknecht—and thousands of others—to their 
deaths were dictated by a specific temporality, that “sudden and tre-
mendously brief apparition of an atypical time in which everything 
that happened—with extreme speed—seemed to happen forever.”65 
The “myth of Spartacus” had reemerged as a messianic prophecy, pro-
viding the plot and setting the stage for what Jesi called the “untime-
liness of revolt.”66 As events unfolded, the streets of Berlin became 
charged with splinters of messianic time, prompting the insurgents to 
an irrevocable choice. It was no longer, as noted by Jesi, a matter of 
living and acting within the framework of tactics and strategy. In the 
face of danger, those who took up arms sensed that only an arrest of 
happening—a break with the continuum of history—could put an end 
to the catastrophe that was already underway.
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